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NASA's Cybersecurity Rating Hasn't Budged in Five Years

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NASA's Cybersecurity Rating Hasn't Budged in Five Years

NASA's information security program has again scored a Level 3 rating in the federal government's annual cybersecurity maturity review, according to a five-page evaluation the agency's Office of Inspector General released on September 16, 2026. The rating, assigned under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, sits one tier below the mark the Office of Management and Budget treats as "effective" for a federal agency's cyber defenses.

A Score That Won't Move

FISMA's maturity scale runs from Level 1, "ad hoc," to Level 5, "optimized." Level 3, "consistently implemented," means an agency has written the right policies and is applying them, but has not yet produced the data to prove those controls work day to day across the organization. Level 4, "managed and measurable," is where OMB starts calling a program effective. Report IG-26-013, covering fiscal year 2026, keeps NASA at Level 3, a mark that Aviation Week reports has now held for five consecutive annual reviews.

Who's Watching the Privileged Accounts

The prior year's evaluation, IG-25-007, released in July 2025, traced part of the problem to identity management. NASA could not show that strong authentication was enforced for every privileged account across the agency, auditors found, because NASA does not track privileged users at the enterprise level. NASA runs ten field centers, from Johnson Space Center in Houston to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, and each has historically managed much of its own IT environment. OIG auditors have repeatedly tied cybersecurity gaps to that decentralized structure rather than to any single broken tool.

A Familiar Pattern

This is not a new theme for NASA's auditors. A 2020 OIG review, IG-20-017, found that four of six sampled information systems were running on contingency plans outdated by as much as four years, including one still operating under a plan written in 2016. NASA closed out the recommendations tied to that report, but the enterprise-wide tracking gap flagged five years later points to the same structural weakness: individual centers and system owners managing security controls locally, with no agency-wide view to confirm the controls are actually enforced.

Sixteen Recommendations, Five NASA Won't Accept

The Government Accountability Office reached a similar conclusion from a different angle. Its report Cybersecurity: NASA Needs to Fully Implement Risk Management, published June 25, 2025, measured NASA against the National Institute of Standards and Technology's seven-step risk management framework: prepare, categorize, select controls, implement controls, assess control implementation, authorize, and continuously monitor. Reviewing a sample of two major projects and their associated systems, GAO found NASA had only partially carried out key activities within most of those steps, and it issued sixteen recommendations. One called on NASA's chief information officer to prepare and get sign-off on an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. NASA concurred with seven of the sixteen recommendations, partially concurred with four, and did not concur with five, including the one on the agency-wide risk assessment, which it objected to on sensitivity grounds. GAO's position is that all sixteen remain warranted, and its tracker still lists them as open.

A Challenge List That Keeps Repeating Itself

The OIG's own forecast for the year ahead, published November 12, 2026, names cybersecurity among five top management and performance challenges facing NASA, alongside lunar operations, low Earth orbit sustainability, program governance, and mission support. It is a recurring entry: cybersecurity and IT governance have appeared on that annual list in some form since 2011.

The lunar section of the same report pairs its own cybersecurity concerns with oversight of Artemis commercial lander contracts and NASA's next-generation spacesuits, both still in development ahead of planned crewed Moon landings later this decade.

First detailed by Aviation Week, drawing on the NASA Office of Inspector General's fiscal year 2026 FISMA evaluation.