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Yamcs Mission Control Software Had No Limit on Login Tries

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Yamcs Mission Control Software Had No Limit on Login Tries

Yamcs, the open-source mission control platform that Space Applications Services built out of support work for ESA's Columbus laboratory module, shipped version 5.12.7 on May 27, 2026, to fix a login endpoint that never locked anyone out. Versions before that release let an unauthenticated attacker send unlimited password guesses to the platform's POST /auth/token endpoint without ever triggering an HTTP 429 response, according to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4, tracked as CVE-2026-44596.

The researcher who reported it, Daniel Miranda Barcelona, published a proof-of-concept script that fired twenty failed login attempts at a local Yamcs instance. Every one came back as a plain 401, with no lockout, no delay, and no rate limiting of any kind, a gap classified under CWE-307. In the advisory, Barcelona noted that Yamcs runs ground segment operations for missions including ESA's OPS-SAT, alongside the commercial and academic deployments the project lists on its own site. Databases disagree on just how bad that makes the bug: GitHub's own scoring calls it medium at 5.3, a GitLab advisory puts it at 6.5, and one third-party aggregator, Strix, rates it critical at 9.8.

A second bug seven weeks later

Space Applications Services pushed out versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2 on July 14, 2026, closing a separate hole tracked as CVE-2026-55547. This one sat in the platform's identity and access management API: the handlers behind GET /api/roles, GET /api/roles/{name}, and GET /api/privileges were missing the SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess check that was supposed to gate them. Any authenticated user, regardless of what permissions an administrator had actually assigned, could call those endpoints and read back the system's entire role and privilege structure. The fix, committed as c2aec1c, added the missing check. Rated CWE-285 and CWE-862 with a CVSS score of 4.3, it is not dramatic on its own, but it hands an attacker who already has one low-privilege account a complete map of what to target next.

Not Yamcs's first disclosure this cycle

Both bugs landed less than a year after Yamcs drew much larger headlines. At Black Hat USA and DEF CON in August 2025, VisionSpace researchers Andrzej Olchawa and Milenko Starcik disclosed 37 vulnerabilities spanning NASA's core Flight System and Yamcs, all patched before the talk, and demonstrated firing a simulated spacecraft's thrusters by exploiting the software stack. That presentation argued the Yamcs path was the easier of the two to reach in practice, since a phishing email that gets an operator to load a malicious configuration file can be enough, where attacking the flight software side first requires access to a ground station running on unprotected frequencies.

Rules exist, just not for login throttling

Ground segment security has its own federal guidance by now. NIST's IR 8401 applies the NIST Cybersecurity Framework specifically to ground systems, recommending that operators isolate components that talk to the space segment and authenticate command frames with counters or nonces to block replay. CISA's 2024 recommendations to space system operators go further, naming the ground segment as the point where most attacks on space systems actually begin. Neither document was written with brute-force login throttling or IAM endpoint authorization specifically in mind, because those are not satellite-specific problems. They are the same web-application basics that show up in audits of ordinary enterprise software, just running on a platform that also talks to orbiting hardware.

Yamcs's own user list spans NASA, ESA, the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre, and Carnegie Mellon University, and the dual AGPL and commercial licensing model has pulled in smaller players too. Pixxel, the Indian hyperspectral-imaging company, maintains its own public fork of the Yamcs repository on GitHub, one of several commercial smallsat operators building mission operations on the same open-source base the big agencies run.

First documented in the GitHub Security Advisory database and the Yamcs project's own disclosure records.